Service Oriented Computing (SOC) has initially developed for the Internet, but also identified as an appealing computing paradigm for developing applications in distributed wireless environments. The open nature of wireless medium may expose services to a variety of unauthorized third parties (eavesdroppers), resulting in insecure service interactions, while cooperative jamming is promising to provide a strong form of security. This paper focuses on security performance study of wireless communications for service interactions among different parties in SOC. More specifically, this paper establishes a theoretical framework for the study of eavesdropper-tolerance capability (i.e., the maximum number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated) in a two-hop wireless network, where the cooperative jamming is adopted to ensure security defined by secrecy outage probability (SOP) and opportunistic relaying is adopted to guarantee reliability defined by transmission outage probability (TOP). For the concerned network, exact modeling for SOP and fine approximation for TOP are first conducted based on the Central Limit Theorem. With the help of SOP and TOP models and also the Stochastic Ordering Theory, the model for eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis is then developed. Finally, extensive simulation and numerical results are provided to illustrate the efficiency of our theoretical framework as well as the eavesdroppertolerance capability of the concerned network from adopting cooperative jamming and opportunistic relaying.
INTRODUCTION
S ERVICE Oriented Computing (SOC), which represents a novel computing paradigm that utilizes services as fundamental elements for developing applications/solutions, provides new kinds of flexible business structures and improves the productivity of applications [1] , [2] . Although SOC was initially developed for Internet-scale environment, the rapid advances of wireless communication technologies such as MANETs, wireless sensor networks, etc., has motivated extensive research efforts on the implementation of SOC in such distributed wireless settings [3] , [4] and references therein. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, services in wireless environment may be vulnerable to the malicious modification and illegal utilization by a variety of unauthorized third parties (eavesdroppers) who do not pay for them, posing a significant threat to the security of service interactions in the SOC. Thus, ensuring the security of wireless communications plays an essential role in providing secure service interactions, which would greatly contribute to the security of SOC in wireless environments. This paper focuses on the security performance study of wireless communications for service interactions among different parties in the SOC.
Traditionally, information is secured above the physical layer by applying cryptography [5] . The idea of cryptography is to encrypt the information through cryptographic protocols that are hard to break in practice by any eavesdropper with limited computing power and without the secret key. These schemes are therefore termed computationally secure [6] , since they are built around the unproven computational hardness assumption. However, recent advances in computing power (e.g., quantum computing) could make it possible to break such difficult cryptographic protocols [7] . In general, other security mechanisms above the physical layer in a variety of wireless technologies (e.g., 802.11, 802.16 and 3GPP UMTS) are also vulnerable to various attacks due to their inherent vulnerabilities [8] , [9] , [10] . Thus, the demand for everlasting security in modern wireless communications becomes more and more urgent. That is why there is an increasing interest recently in physical layer security, behind which the fundamental idea is to exploit the inherent physical characteristics of communication channels to provide information-theoretic security to the legitimate transmissions without the assistance of a secret key [11] , [12] . It is more important that no limitations are assumed for the eavesdroppers in terms of the computing power or network parameter knowledge. Moreover, the physical layer security approaches can offer some significant advantages over the traditional cryptographic scheme, like no need to employ complicated cryptographic protocols and guaranteeing an everlasting security without applying key distribution and management, which is extremely expensive and difficult for large scale decentralized networks. Additionally, physical layer techniques can be used with cryptographic approaches in a complementary way and thus can augment the security achieved by cryptography. Therefore, physical layer approaches have been very promising in guaranteeing a strong form of security in wireless communications.
Motivations
In the seminal work [13] on the physical layer security, Wyner introduced the wire-tap channel model where the source transmits messages to the intended receiver over a discrete memoryless main channel which is wire-tapped by an eavesdropper (wire-tapper) through another discrete memoryless channel, called wiretap channel. This work was later generalized to the broadcast model in [14] and to the Gaussian setting in [15] . These works indicated that perfect secrecy can be achieved if the intended receiver has a better channel than the eavesdropper, which however can hardly be satisfied in practice. Thus, many works sought to explore the possibility of secure transmission when the eavesdropper observes a better channel. (Please refer to Section 6.1 for related works). Among the physical layer security approaches proposed in these works, cooperative jamming, where non-transmitting helpers generate random noise to confuse the eavesdropper, has attracted considerable attention [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] .
By now, various works have been dedicated to explore the security performances in wireless networks with cooperative jamming. For instance, the secrecy capacity maximization problem was investigated in [16] , [17] , [18] based on cooperative communication, how to design effective jamming strategies in terms of power or position of jamming was analyzed in [19] , [20] , [21] , the opportunistic selection and use of the relays to enhance the physical layer security was studied in [22] , [23] , [24] , the per-node secure throughput in large decentralized networks was explored in [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] . However, to the best of our knowledge, relatively fewer works consider the performance limits of the eavesdroppertolerance capability of a network (Please refer to Section 6.2 for related works). As shown in [30] , [31] , the density of the eavesdroppers has a dramatic impact on the connectivity of secrecy graph and the secrecy throughput, which implies that the number of eavesdroppers present in the network is critical in guaranteeing the network security. Knowing the relationship between the eavesdropper-tolerance capability and other network parameters not only plays an important role in the security performance analysis of the network but also serve as the guideline on determining the system parameters to build a secure network for the designers. Therefore, we focus on the eavesdropper-tolerance capability study of wireless networks in this paper.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework to explore the eavesdropper-tolerance capability in a two-hop wireless network, where the cooperative jamming is adopted to ensure security defined by secrecy outage probability (SOP) and opportunistic relaying is adopted to guarantee reliability defined by transmission outage probability (TOP). The performance analysis in such simple networks is envisioned to lay the groundwork for the study of general multi-hop wireless networks. Different from [32] , we use different outage probability metrics that can fully characterize the security and reliability of the end-to-end transmission. More importantly, we consider the inherent channel dependence of the transmissions in two hops, which is critical in determining the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
We first apply the tools from Probability Theory (e.g., Central Limit Theorem) to develop the theoretical models for both SOP and TOP of a sourcedestination transmission. Based on the SOP and TOP models and also the Stochastic Ordering Theory, we then conduct analysis to reveal the monotonicity properties of SOP and TOP. With the help of such properties, the model for eavesdropper-tolerance capability is derived. A simulator is developed to validate the efficiency of our theoretical framework and numerical results are also provided to illustrate the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of the concerned network from adopting cooperative jamming and opportunistic relaying. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model and problem formulation. In Section 3, we conduct the modeling of SOP and TOP of the end-to-end transmission. The model for eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis is developed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the simulation and numerical results to validate our theoretical model. Section 6 introduces the related works and Section 7 concludes the paper.
SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

System Model and Assumptions
As depicted in Fig. 1 , we consider a two-hop wireless network scenario consisting of a source node S, a destination node D, n legitimate half-duplex relays R 1 ; R 2 ; . . . ; R n that cannot transmit and receive at the same time and m passive and independently-operating eavesdroppers E 1 ; E 2 ; . . . ; E m . We assume that the direct link between S and D does not exist due to the deep fading and thus S needs to transmit messages to D via one of the relays. Each of the eavesdroppers attempts to intercept the messages independently based on its own observation. Meanwhile, some of the remaining n À 1 relays will be selected to generate artificial noise to suppress the eavesdroppers during the transmission. We aim to ensure both the secure and reliable transmission from S to D against these eavesdroppers of unknown channel information.
Time is slotted and a slow, flat, block Rayleigh Fading environment is assumed, where the channel remains static for one time slot and varies randomly and independently from slot to slot. The channel gain from a transmitter A to a receiver B is modeled by a complex zero-mean Gaussian random variable h A;B and thus jh A;B j 2 is an exponential random variable. We assume that jh A;
stands for the expectation operator. All the channel gains jh S;R i j 2 , jh R i ;D j 2 ,jh S;E k j 2 ,jh R i ;E k j 2 and jh R i ;R j j 2 for i 2 ½1; n, j 2 ½1; n; j 6 ¼ i and k 2 ½1; m are assumed independent and identically distributed. It is assumed that the source S and the relays transmit with the same power P t . In addition, we assume the network is interference-limited and thus the noise at each receiver is negligible.
In order to improve the link condition from S to D, the opportunistic relaying scheme in [33] is adopted, where the best relay R b is selected by a timer-based method to forward messages. Here, b is given by
After the relay selection, the transmission then can be conducted in two hops. In the first hop, S transmits the message to R b . At the same time, relays with indices in
where t is the noise-generating threshold to control the interference at legitimate receivers, generate artificial noise to suppress the eavesdroppers. Analogous to the first hop, R b forwards its received message to D with relays whose indices are in
generating noise to assist the transmission in the second hop.
We assume that only one source-destination transmission, including the relay selection, can be conducted in one time slot before the channels change again. The received signalto-interference ratio (SIR) at a receiver (e.g., R b ) can be formulated as
For the eavesdroppers and legitimate receivers, we use positive g e and g respectively to denote the minimum SIR required to recover the received message. That is, a legitimate receiver (eavesdropper) is able to decode the transmitted message if and only if its received SIR exceeds g (g e ). This SIR threshold scheme can be easily mapped to the Wyner's encoding scheme where the transmitter chooses two rates, the rate of transmitted codewords R t and the rate of the confidential message R s [13] , [34] . The rate difference R e ¼ R t À R s reflects the cost of securing the message against the eavesdroppers. The conversions between the thresholds and the code rates are g ¼ 2 R t À 1 and g e ¼ 2 R e À 1. Therefore, the results in this paper also applies to the Wyner's encoding scheme.
Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we first introduce the concepts of TOP and SOP of the concerned network, based on which we then formulate our problem regarding the eavesdroppertolerance capability in this paper.
To fully characterize the security and reliability performances of the transmission, we adopt the same outage definitions in [34] . Consider the direct link from a transmitter A to a legitimate receiver B. We say transmission outage happens if B cannot decode the message (i.e., SIR A;B < g) and secrecy outage happens if at least one of the eavesdroppers (say E i ) can decode the message (i.e., SIR A;E i ! g e ). It is shown in [26] that securing each of the individual links is sufficient to secure the end-to-end path. Thus, the secrecy
Then we can introduce the following definitions:
TOP for opportunistic relaying P to bst : This probability is defined as the probability that the transmission outage of the S ! R b ! D link happens under the opportunistic relaying scheme. SOP for opportunistic relaying P so bst : This probability is defined as the probability that the secrecy outage of the S ! R b ! D link happens under the opportunistic relaying scheme. Based on the above definitions, P to bst and P so bst can be formulated as
where PðÁÞ stands for the probability operator and ðaÞ follows since the received power of each eavesdropper in two phases are independent and identically distributed. It is notable that the second PðÁÞ term in (1) cannot be formulated as
since SIR S;R b and SIR R b ;D are dependent due to the opportunistic relaying scheme, as will be observed in Appendix A, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ TSC.2015.2478453.
Since security and reliability are two important metrics in network design, we use the SOP constraint " s and TOP constraint " t to represent the security and reliability requirements of the end-to-end transmission. We say that the transmission from S to D is secure if and only if P so bst " s and it is reliable if and only if P to bst " t . Notice that larger " s and " t represent less stringent security and reliability requirements. In this paper, we aim to determine the exact P to bst and P so bst , which can be then used to determine the exact eavesdropper-tolerance capability while ensuring both the reliable and secure end-to-end transmission. We use m Ã bst to represent the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for the opportunistic relaying scheme hereafter.
Based on the above observations, we are now ready to formulate our problem. From the definition of P to bst and P so bst , we can see that when given the number of system relays n, the SIR thresholds g, g e , the security requirement " s and reliability requirement " t , m Ã bst only depends on the noisegenerating threshold t. Thus, we define the maximum number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated for a specified t by M bst ðtÞ ¼ maxfm : P so bst ðn; m; tÞ " s g:
Now the considered problem can be formulated as maximize t M bst ðtÞ subject to P to bst ðn; tÞ " t ; t ! 0 " t 2 ½0; 1; " s 2 ½0; 1;
(3)
where P to bst and P so bst are regarded as functions. That is, we want to maximize M bst ðtÞ over t. We use t b bst to represent the optimal t that maximizes M bst ðtÞ for opportunistic relaying scheme and thus we have m Ã bst ¼ M bst ðt b bst Þ. In order to explore the efficiency of the opportunistic relaying scheme, we also give the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of the same network scenario but with a random relay selection scheme as a comparison, which is considered in [35] . Similarly, for random relay selection scheme, we define the TOP by P to ran , the SOP by P so ran , the optimal t by t b ran and the eavesdropper-tolerance capability by m Ã ran .
OUTAGE PERFORMANCES
In this section we determine the TOP P to bst and SOP P so bst of the network with opportunistic relaying scheme based on some theoretical analysis. Applying the same approach, we also give the outage probabilities of the network with random relay selection scheme.
SOP and TOP For Opportunistic Relaying
Before determining the TOP of a network with opportunistic relaying, we first define the total interference at the legitimate receiver in two phases by
Then, we establish the following lemmas regarding the probability distribution of I 1 , I 2 and an important joint probability of the channel gains in two phases, which is critical in determining P to bst .
Lemma 1. For one message transmission from S to D, the total interference I 1 and I 2 are independent and identically distributed, and can be approximated by a normal random variable. Thus, the corresponding pdf is given by
is the standard derivation of the normal random variable.
Lemma 2. For one message transmission from S to D, the joint probability that jh S;R b j 2 is greater than some constant x ! 0 and jh R b ;D j 2 is greater than some constant y ! 0 can be determined as ; e À2x and 2 F 1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function.
Remark 1. Since S and relays transmit with the same power, P t can be reduced in determining the TOP as shown in (1) , and thus it is not considered in Lemma 1. The proofs of the above lemmas can be found in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material.
For a two-hop wireless network with opportunistic relaying scheme, we are now ready to derive its TOP P to bst and SOP P so bst of the end-to-end transmission based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 1. Consider the network scenario in Fig. 1 with opportunistic relaying and cooperative jamming schemes. The TOP P to bst and SOP P so bst can be given by
and Proof. We first prove the P to bst in (4). According to the definition in (1), we have
Applying the law of total probability, we have
where ðbÞ is due to Lemma 1 and ðcÞ follows after applying Lemma 2.
Now we proceed to prove the P so bst in (5) . According to the definition in (2), we first need to derive the probabil-
Note that the number of noise-generating relays in the first hop jR 1 j follows the binomial distribution Bðn À 1; 1 À e Àt Þ. Now, we define the event that there are l noise-generating relays in the first hop (i.e., jR 1 j ¼ l) by B l and thus we have
where ðdÞ follows since all the fSIR S;E i ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; mg are conditionally independent given event B l , ðeÞ follows by applying the law of total probability and the expectation is computed with respect to fjh R j ;E i j 2 ; j 2 R 1 g, ðfÞ follows since all the jh R j ;E i j 2 are independent and identically distributed and ðgÞ follows by applying the binomial theorem. Therefore, (5) follows after substituting (7) into (2). t u
SOP and TOP For Random Relay Selection
Applying the same approach, we now can establish the following lemma about the TOP and SOP under the random relay selection scheme.
Lemma 3. Consider the network scenario in Fig. 1 with random relay selection scheme. The TOP P to ran and SOP P so ran can be given by
and
Proof. Please refer to [35] .
t u
EAVESDROPPER-TOLERANCE CAPABILITY
Eavesdropper-tolerance capability characterizes how many eavesdroppers can be tolerated at most by a wireless network with n relays in order to guarantee the desired security requirement " s and reliability requirement " t . In this section, we determine the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for opportunistic relaying scheme based on the problem formulation in Section 2.2. The eavesdropper-tolerance capability for random relay selection scheme is also provided by applying the same approach.
Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability for Opportunistic Relaying
It can be observed from the transmission scheme in Section 2.1 and the problem formulation in Section 2.2 that the noise-generating threshold t is a critical parameter in determining the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. A too large t will do harm to the end-to-end transmission, while too small t is not enough to interfere the eavesdroppers. Therefore, finding an optimal t is the key to solving our considered problem. Before solving the problem, we establish the following lemma based on the Stochastic Ordering in [36] . Then X is said to be smaller than Y in the usual stochastic order (denoted by X st Y). And for all increasing function f, we always have E½fðXÞ E½fðYÞ.
Based on the above lemma, we then establish the following lemmas in terms of the monotonicity of SOP and TOP with respect to t.
Lemma 5. The TOP P to bst for opportunistic relaying scheme increases as t increases.
Proof. For any 0 < t 1 < t 2 , we use random vector I 1 ¼ ðI 1 1 ; I 1 2 Þ to represent the interferences in two phases when the noise-generating threshold is t 1 and I 2 ¼ ðI 2 1 ; I 2 2 Þ to represent those interferences for t 2 . For any upper set U ¼ ðI 1 It is easy to see that PðI 1 1 ! xÞ < PðI 2 1 ! xÞ and PðI 1 2 ! yÞ < PðI 2 2 ! yÞ, since more interference can be generated as t increases. Therefore, we have PðI 1 2 UÞ < PðI 2 2 UÞ and then I 1 st I 2 according to Lemma 4. Define the term Pðjh S;R b j 2 ! gI 1 ; jh R b ;D j 2 ! gI 2 Þ in (6) by GðIÞ which decreases as I increases, where I ¼ ðI 1 ; I 2 Þ. Thus, we have E½GðI 1 Þ > E½GðI 2 Þ according to Lemma 4. That is, for any 0 < t 1 < t 2 , we always have P to bst ðt 1 Þ < P to bst ðt 2 Þ, which indicates the TOP P to bst increases with t. t u Lemma 6. The SOP P so bst for opportunistic relaying scheme decreases as t increases, while increasing as m increases.
Proof. Notice that the step following ðfÞ in (7) can also be written as
where the expectation is computed with respect to jR 1 j. For any 0 t 1 < t 2 , we use two random variables jR 1 1 j and jR 2 1 j to represent the number of noise-generating relays in the first phase, where jR 1 1 j $ Bðn À 1; 1 À e Àt 1 Þ and jR 2 1 j $ Bðn À 1; 1 À e Àt 2 Þ:
It is shown in [37] that jR 1 1 j st jR 2 1 j. Applying Lemma 4 again, we can see that
Therefore, the SOP P so bst decreases as t increases. Next, we consider the step following ðfÞ in (7) again. It is easy to see that the term 1 À 1 1 þ g e l 2 ½0; 1Þ:
Thus, the term ½1 À ð 1 1þg e Þ l m decreases with m. Therefore, the SOP P so bst increases as m increases. t u
Define step ðgÞ in (7) by a function Gðm; n; tÞ. Then we can derive the eavesdropper-tolerance capability m Ã bst for opportunistic relaying scheme based on Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Theorem 2. Consider the network scenario in Fig. 1 with opportunistic relaying scheme. The eavesdropper-tolerance capability under the security constraint " s and reliability constraint " t is
and t b bst is the solution of P to bst ¼ " t . Proof. As shown in (3), we need to find the optimal t that maximizes M bst ðtÞ, where M bst ðtÞ ¼ maxfm : Gðm; n; tÞ ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p g;
according to its definition. Since the TOP P to bst increases with t according to Lemma 5, in order to guarantee the reliability (i.e., P to bst " t ), t must take values in the region ½0; t m , where t m is the solution of P to bst ¼ " t . Next, we need to prove that t m is the optimal t (i.e., t b bst ¼ t m ). That is, for any t 2 ½0; t m Þ we always have M bst ðtÞ M bst ðt m Þ. Now we prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exists a t 0 2 ½0; t m Þ such that M bst ðt 0 Þ ! M bst ðt m Þ þ 1. It is easy to see that GðM bst ðt m Þ þ 1; n; t m Þ < ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p ;
since M bst ðt m Þ is the largest m satisfying Gðm; n; t m Þ ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p . By Lemma 6, it can be observed that Gðm; n; tÞ increases with t, whereas decreases with m. Thus, we have GðM bst ðt m Þ þ 1; n; t 0 Þ < GðM bst ðt m Þ þ 1; n; t m Þ < ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p and GðM bst ðt m Þ þ 1; n; t 0 Þ ! GðM bst ðt 0 Þ; n; t 0 Þ ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p :
We can see that the above two inequalities are contradictory. Thus, for any t 2 ½0; t m Þ we always have M bst ðtÞ M bst ðt m Þ (i.e., t b bst ¼ t m ) and thus the eavesdropper-tolerance capability is
Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability for Random Relay Selection
Applying the same approach, we can establish the following lemma regarding the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for random relay selection.
Lemma 7. Consider the network scenario in Fig. 1 with random relay selection scheme. The eavesdropper-tolerance capability under the security constraint " s and reliability constraint " t is m Ã ran ¼ maxfm : Gðm; n; t b ran Þ ! ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 À " s p g;
where Gðm; n; t b ran Þ ¼
and t b ran is the solution of
:
Although the exact expressions for m Ã bst and m Ã ran are not available, it is easy to calculate them numerically due to the monotonicity of Gðm; n; tÞ with respect to m, after calculating the corresponding optimal noise-generating threshold t for these two relay selection schemes.
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first verify our theoretical model for TOP and SOP through extensive simulations. We then explore how the number of relays n, the SIR thresholds g, g e , the security constraint " s and the reliability constraint " t affect the eavesdropper-tolerance capability for opportunistic relaying scheme. Besides, we illustrate the inherent tradeoffs between the eavesdropper-tolerance capability and security/ reliability constraint. Finally, we compare the opportunistic relaying scheme with the random relay selection scheme with respect to the eavesdropper-tolerance capability.
Model Validation
A simulator was developed in C++ to simulate the message transmission from the source S to the destination D based on the transmission scheme in Section 2.1, which is now available at [38] . The SIR threshold for legitimate receivers is fixed as g ¼ 10 and that for eavesdroppers is fixed as g e ¼ 0:5. The total number of end-to-end transmissions is fixed as 100; 000. The channel varies randomly and independently from one transmission to another. The simulated TOP (SOP) is calculated as the ratio of the number of transmissions suffering from transmission outage (secrecy outage) to the total number 100; 000. Notice that the simulations with other settings can be easily performed by our simulator as well.
Extensive simulations have been conducted to verify our TOP and SOP models. For the TOP, we considered three different network scenarios of t ¼ 0:05, 0:075 and 0:1, which correspond to low interference, moderate interference and high interference compared to the considered network size. For the SOP, we also considered three different network scenarios of ðm ¼ 100; t ¼ 0:05Þ, ðm ¼ 100; t ¼ 0:1Þ and ðm ¼ 500; t ¼ 0:05Þ, which correspond to sparse eavesdroppers with low interference, sparse eavesdroppers with high interference, and dense eavesdroppers with low interference. The corresponding simulated results and theoretical results are summarized in Figs. 2 and 3 . Figs. 2 and 3 indicate clearly that the simulated results match nicely with the theoretical ones for both TOP and SOP, so our theoretical model can be used to effectively explore the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. A further careful observation of Fig. 2 shows that there is still a very small gap between the simulated results and the theoretical ones when the number of relays n is very small. For example, for the case that t ¼ 0:075, the simulated value for P to bst is 0:10314 while the theoretical value is 0:07329 for n ¼ 30, compared to the simulated value of 0:46626 and theoretical value of 0:46645 for n ¼ 80. This is because that the Central Limit Theorem used in deriving our theoretical result fails to model the pdf of the total interference I 1 and I 2 very well for small values of n. We can see from Fig. 2 that P to bst increases with n. This suggests that although the best relay selection scheme can benefit the transmission as n increases, the interferences from the noise-generating relays dominate the tendency of the received SIR at legitimate receivers. By comparing these three curves in Fig. 2 , it can also be observed that P to bst increases as t increases, which agrees with Lemma 5. This is due to the reason that more interferences will be generated at the intended receiver for lager t, and thus it is more difficult for the receivers to successfully recover the messages.
We can see from Fig. 3 that P so bst decreases as n increases. This is because more interferences can be generated at the eavesdroppers by distributing more relays for a specific t. By comparing these three curves in Fig. 3 , it can also be observed that P so bst increases as m increases while decreases as t increases, which agree with Lemma 6. This is intuitive since distributing more eavesdroppers by the adversary would post more potential threats to the end-to-end transmission and increasing t would generate more interferences at the eavesdroppers, so it is more difficult for them to successfully decode the messages.
Eavesdropper-Tolerance Performances
Based on the SOP and TOP models, we now explore the performance of eavesdropper-tolerance capability for opportunistic relaying scheme. To illustrate the impact of security and reliability constraints on the eavesdropper-tolerance capability, we show in Fig. 4 the behavior of m Ã bst versus " t and " s for the network scenario of n ¼ 2; 000; g ¼ 10; g e ¼ 0:5, which implies that the eavesdroppers have a much better decoding ability than the legitimate receivers. We can observe from Fig. 4 that m Ã bst increases as " t and " s increase. This reflects that the network can tolerate more eavesdroppers by relaxing either the security or reliability requirement. A careful observation of Fig. 4 indicates that " t increases as " s decreases in order to guarantee a certain level of eavesdropper-tolerance capability. For example, " t has to increase from 0:04 to 0:085 as " s decreases from 0:03 to 0:02 for achieving an eavesdropper-tolerance capacity of about 1; 000. This suggests that either the security or reliability requirement has to sacrifice for the other one in order to achieve a certain eavesdropper-tolerance capability. From the above discussions, we can see that there exists clear tradeoffs between the eavesdropper-tolerance capability and the reliability/security constraint.
To explore how the number of relays affects the eavesdropper-tolerance capability, we illustrate m Ã bst vs. n in Fig. 5 with " t ¼ 0:01 and " s ¼ 0:01 for different settings of g and g e . It can be observed from Fig. 5 that m Ã bst increases as n increases. This is because that although the optimal threshold t b bst decreases as n increase for a specific reliability constraint " t , the corresponding expected number of noisegenerating nodes increases, so more interferences can be generated to suppress the eavesdroppers while the desired reliability can still be ensured. By comparing the three curves, we can also observe that m Ã bst increases as g e increases, while decreases as g increases. This is intuitive since decreasing the decoding ability (i.e., increasing g e ) of the eavesdroppers would decrease the SOP, while decreasing the decoding ability (i.e., increasing g) of legitimate receivers would increase the TOP. It is interesting to notice that m Ã bst increases dramatically when n is above some threshold in Fig. 5 . For example, for the case of g ¼ 11 and Fig. 3 . SOP for opportunistic relaying P so bst versus number of relays n with different settings of m and t, when g e ¼ 0:5. Fig. 4 . Eavesdropper-tolerance capability m Ã bst for opportunistic relaying versus reliability constraint " t and security constraint " s with n ¼ 2; 000, g ¼ 10 and g e ¼ 0:5. Fig. 5 . Eavesdropper-tolerance capability m Ã bst for opportunistic relaying versus number of relays n with " t ¼ 0:01, and " s ¼ 0:01. g e ¼ 0:6, this threshold is about 2; 500. Thus, distributing more relays would be an effective approach to enhance the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of a network.
In order to explore the efficiency of the opportunistic relaying scheme, we also illustrate the eavesdropper-tolerance capability m Ã ran of random relay selection scheme versus the number of relays n in Fig. 6 with " t ¼ 0:1 and " s ¼ 0:1 for different setting of g and g e . Notice that the security and reliability requirements here are much more relaxed and the decoding ability of the legitimate receivers are much more improved than those for opportunistic relaying in Fig. 5 . For example, g ¼ 0:6 is much smaller compared to g ¼ 10 in Fig. 5 . That means we consider a much more conservative scenario for random relay selection scheme and the network can hardly tolerate any eavesdropper if we consider the same scenario as that in Fig. 5 . It can be observed from Fig. 6 that m Ã ran also increases as g e increases, while decreases as g increases due to the same reason presented in the discussion of Fig. 5 . Even for such a conservative scenario, we still can observe from Figs. 6 and 5 that the eavesdropper tolerance capability of random relay selection is orders of magnitude less than that of opportunistic relaying scheme, especially for large values of n. For example, for the case of g ¼ 0:7 and g e ¼ 0:6 in Fig. 6 , the network can tolerate about 207 eavesdroppers, which is much less than 8; 959 eavesdroppers for the case of g ¼ 11 and g e ¼ 0:6 in Fig. 5 for n ¼ 3; 000. As the eavesdroppertolerance capability for random relay selection scheme decreases with g, it will decreases to 0 if we increases g to 11. This implies that the opportunistic relaying scheme can achieve a significantly better eavesdropper-tolerance capability than random relay selection.
RELATED WORKS
This section first introduces the research efforts on the design of physical layer security approaches and then lists the related works on the study of eavesdropper-tolerance capability.
Physical Layer Security Approaches
Maurer [39] showed that perfect secrecy is achievable when the eavesdropper enjoys a better channel by generating a secret key over a public and error-free feedback channel. Nevertheless, this work is treated as a further step in the direction of public-key cryptology. Hero [40] introduced the spacetime coding over multiple antennas for secure communication and artificial noise injection strategy was first proposed by Negi and Goel [41] , [42] , where the noise generated by the extra antennas of the transmitter such that only the eavesdropper channel is degraded. However, due to the cost of deploying multiple antennas and designing effective noise, these schemes are not suitable for large scale wireless network with nodes of single antenna. Barros and Rodrigues [43] analyzed the secrecy outage probability and outage secrecy capacity of a quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel and showed that fading alone can guarantee the information-theoretic security even when the eavesdropper has a better average SNR than the legitimate receiver. Tekin and Yener [44] introduced the cooperative jamming scheme where a non-transmitting user transmits jamming signals instead of its messages to confuse the eavesdropper. Since random noise can be generated by helper nodes rather than extra antennas, cooperating jamming is more suitable for providing security guarantee in large scale wireless networks.
Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability Analysis
The related works regarding eavesdropper-tolerance capability can be classified into two categories according to the network size. For infinite network scenarios, the scaling law of eavesdropper-tolerance capability against the per-node throughput was studied in [25] by constructing a highway system. By cooperative jamming, Goeckel et al. [32] considered one source-destination pair with opportunistic relaying scheme [33] , where the best relay is selected among the available relays based on some policy in terms of their channels to the source and destination, and analyzed the asymptotic behavior of eavesdropper-tolerance capability as the number of relays goes to infinity. However, the metrics used in their paper cannot fully reflect the security and reliability of the end-to-end transmission. This work was later generalized to a scenario with multiple source-destination pairs where artificial noises are generated from concurrent transmitters [45] . For finite network scenarios, Shen et al. [46] proposed a flexible relay selection scheme and derived the lower bound on the eavesdropper-tolerance capability. However, it is notable that all the above works have focused on either the order-sense scaling law results for infinite networks, or bounds for finite networks. Such order sense results or bounds are certainly important but cannot reflect the actual eavesdropper-tolerance capability in more practical network scenarios with finite nodes, which is more important for the system designers. In our previous work [35] , we considered a random relay selection scheme and derived the exact eavesdropper-tolerance capability, which can exactly tell us how many eavesdroppers a network can tolerate at most for a desired level of security and reliability. However, the results showed that with the random relay selection, the eavesdropper-tolerance performance is not good, especially for small-scale networks and high security/reliability requirement.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper established a theoretical framework to analyze the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of a two-hop wireless network for service interactions in the Service Oriented Computing, where cooperative jamming and opportunistic relaying techniques are adopted to provide secure and reliable end-to-end transmissions against passive and independently-operating eavesdroppers of unknown location and channel information. We first apply the Central Limit Theorem to model the TOP and SOP in closed form, based on which and also the Stochastic Ordering we then develop the model for eavesdropper-tolerance capability analysis. Our results indicate that in general more eavesdroppers can be tolerated in the concerned network if a less stringent requirement on both metrics security and reliability is allowed, but a tradeoff between the requirements on these two metrics does exist to ensure a certain level of eavesdropper-tolerance capability. The results in this paper also reveal that the opportunistic relaying scheme significantly outperforms the random relay selection scheme in terms of the eavesdropper-tolerance capability, and the scheme can guarantee an acceptable eavesdropper-tolerance capability even when a stringent requirement on security and reliability is imposed. Hua Wang is a full time professor at Victoria University. He was a professor at the University of Southern Queensland before he joined Victoria University. He has more than 10 years teaching and working experience in applied informatics at both enterprise and university. He has expertise in electronic commerce, business process modeling and enterprise architecture. As an chief investigator, three Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grants have been awarded since 2006, and 155 peer reviewed scholar papers have been published. Six PhD students have already graduated under his principal supervision.
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